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Tax exceptionalism: a UK perspective 
INTRODUCTION 
In her article in this issue, Professor Kristin Hickman explores the relationship between the 
US Treasury and Internal Revenue Service (‘IRS’), and exceptionalism to general 
administrative law principles, dubbed “tax exceptionalism”. It builds upon work that 
Hickman has produced in response to the 2011 case of Mayo Foundation for Medical 
Education and Research v. United States1 in which the Supreme Court is generally 
considered to have rejected the idea of tax exceptionalism. Indeed, Hickman’s article deals a 
decisive blow to the idea of tax exceptionalism by noting that the functions of the IRS are not 
dissimilar to those of other administrative agencies. Why then “should the IRS avoid general 
administrative law requirements when other agencies administering substantially similar 
programs must follow them?” But that does not mean that questions do not remain. Whilst it 
can be accepted easily that there should be no general exceptionalism, that tells us little about 
“which administrative practices are susceptible to legal challenge under general 
administrative law principles?” or whether provisions of the tax code might in fact “justify 
certain tax-specific departures from general administrative law requirements, doctrines, and 
norms.” 
A similar dichotomy can be said to arise in the UK between on the one hand the idea 
that there are no special principles of public law which apply to tax law and on the other hand 
the fact that the application of general principles of law in respect of the tax administration, 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (‘HMRC’), will differ from treatment given to other 
administrative agencies. This article will explore this dichotomy by first exploring briefly the 
history of the prospect of tax exceptionalism in the UK, and thereafter looking in depth at 
instances where HMRC may be said in practice to benefit from distinct treatment. The article 
will further assess situations where greater tolerance was given to HMRC actions than ought 
to have been afforded. 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF EXCEPTIONALISM IN UK TAX JURISPRUDENCE 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines exceptionalism as being “[o]f the nature of or forming 
an exception; out of the ordinary course, unusual, special.” The term is used in many contexts 
to connote different situations of “exception”, such as in “just war theory” where 
exceptionalism seeks to establish that killing can be justified in war in instances which would 
not be justified outside of war.2 It may refer to a nation’s or supranational body’s 
understanding of itself that it is for some reason distinct from traditional norms.3 
                                                 
1 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011). Hickman K. 
(2013), Unpacking the Force of Law. Vanderbilt Law Review, 66(2), 465-543; Hickman K. (2014), 
Administering the tax system we have. Duke Law Journal, 63, 1717-1770. 
2 See Allhoff F., Evans HG., Henschke A. (2013), Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War: Just War Theory in 
the 21st Century. London: Routledge, p. 206. 
3 See for instance Hodgson G. (2009), The Myth of American Exceptionalism. Yale: Yale University Press, 128 
and Kant I. (2016), European exceptionalism and the EU's accession to the ECHR. European Journal of 
International Law, 27(3), 565-589 (Comment). 
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Exceptionalism might even relate to privacy, such as in the case of genetic exceptionalism 
which treats genetic data as unique and thereby requiring of special, more rigid protection.4 
Exceptionalism at its core requires there to be some kind of distinct understanding of a 
particular entity, which would in turn dictate that different rules or principles would apply. 
Does this kind of exceptionalism in terms of public law apply to HMRC? In R. 
(Coughlan) v. North & East Devon Health Authority,5 this was decisively rejected by Lord 
Woolf: “It cannot be suggested that special principles of public law apply to the Inland 
Revenue or to taxpayers.”6 
That has not always however been the understanding. For instance, it was once the 
orthodox view that the interpretation of taxing statutes departed from the general rules of 
statutory construction in that “literal interpretation” should apply. As explained by 
Loutzenhiser, people were not to be taxed unless they were designated in clear terms by the 
taxing Act as taxpayers and the amount of their liability was clearly defined.7 It was in this 
context that some of the most memorable statements about interpreting tax statutes arose. In 
the 1869 case of Partington v. Attorney General, Lord Cairns wrote that if the Crown “cannot 
bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within 
the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be.” 8 In the 1921 case of Cape 
Brandy v IRC, Rowlatt J held that there is “no equity about a tax…Nothing is to be read in, 
nothing is to be implied.”9 Lord Tomlin in the 1936 Duke of Westminster case wrote that 
“[e]very man is entitled if he can to arrange his affairs so that the tax attaching under the 
appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be.”10  
This approach by the courts however was considerably “softened”11 by the notorious 
Ramsay case.12 Lord Wilberforce held therein that the courts are not confined to literal 
interpretation: “There may, indeed should, be considered the context and scheme of the 
relevant Act as a whole, and its purpose may, indeed should, be regarded.”13 Thus, in IRC v. 
McGuckian Lord Steyn emphasised that there had been a shift away from the literalist 
approach to a purposive method of construction: “Where there is no obvious meaning of a 
statutory provision the modern emphasis is on a contextual approach designed to identify the 
purpose of a statute and to give effect to it.”14 
Besides the historical flirtation with statutory construction, general principles of 
public law have applied in the case of HMRC, and its predecessor bodies the Inland Revenue 
and Customs & Excise, just as they are applied with respect to other entities carrying out 
public functions. Indeed, judicial review cases of actions by the UK taxing authorities have 
contributed generously to the development of public law such as in relation to the doctrine of 
                                                 
4 Krajewska A. (2011), The right to personality in (post)-genomic medicine: a new way of thinking for the new 
frontier, European Human Rights Law Review, 1, 54-70, p. 55. 
5 R. (Coughlan) v. North & East Devon Health Authority [1999] EWCA Civ. 1871, [2001] Q.B. 21. 
6 Ibid, para 61. 
7 On which, see: Loutzenhiser G. (2016), Tiley’s Revenue Law, 8th edn. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 40. 
8 Partington v. Attorney General (1869) L.R. 4 H.L. 100, 122. 
9 Cape Brandy v. IRC [1921] 1 K.B. 64, p. 71 
10 Duke of Westminster v. IRC [1936] A.C. 1, p. 19. 
11 King J. (2008), The Pervasiveness of Polycentricity, Public Law. 101-124, p. 114. 
12 Ramsay v. IRC [1982] A.C. 300. 
13 Ibid, p. 323. 
14 IRC v. McGuckian [1997] 1 W.L.R. 991, p. 999. 
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legitimate expectations,15 the use of Parliamentary materials in interpreting statutes,16 and 
standing.17 
THE DISTINCT TREATMENT OF HMRC 
However, whilst there may no longer be “exceptionalism” in terms of the application of 
general principles of public law to HMRC, it does not follow that principles of public law 
apply in the same manner to the body as they do with respect to other entities carrying out 
public functions. For this reason, Lord Carnwath in The United Policyholders Group v The 
Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (‘The United Policyholders’),18 added a 
qualification to Lord Woolf’s earlier assertion in Coughlan: 
 
“It is of course true that the Revenue is not governed by special principles of 
public law. But those principles take effect in a special context… The 
Revenue’s function is not to make the policy, but to collect the tax. It has a 
wide managerial discretion... Even in that context, it is only in “exceptional 
circumstances” that the court will overrule the exercise of discretion by the 
commission…”19 
 
The wide managerial discretion to which Lord Carnwath referred in this extract is 
derived from HMRC’s primary statutory function which, by section 5 of the Commissioners 
for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 (‘CRCA 2005’), is to collect and manage20 taxes and 
credits.21 This statutory provision places an overarching “managerial discretion” in the hands 
of HMRC as to how it carries out these functions.22  
The breadth of the discretion was explained in Fleet Street Casuals, wherein the 
House of Lords endorsed an agreement by the Revenue effectively not to investigate tax 
evasion. A federation representing small businesses and self-employed individuals brought an 
application for judicial review of a Revenue decision to grant an “amnesty” to a group of 
                                                 
15 In Re Preston [1985] 2 W.L.R. 836; R v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte MFK Underwriting Agents 
Ltd [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1545; Matrix Securities Ltd v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1994] 1 W.L.R. 334; R v. 
Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Unilever plc [1996] S.T.C. 681. 
16 Pepper v. Hart [1992] S.T.C. 898. 
17 See R v. IRC, ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses [1982] A.C. 617 (‘Fleet 
Street Casuals’). 
18 The United Policyholders Group v. The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2016] UKPC 17, [2016] 1 
W.L.R. 3383. 
19 Ibid, para 114. 
20 Prior to 2005, taxes were said to be under the ‘care and management’ of the Inland Revenue and Customs and 
Excise. CRCA 2005 s. 51(3) ensures that the references to collection and management are to be understood as 
meaning ‘care and management’. On which see: CRCA 2005, s.5 (2). On which, see: Inland Revenue 
Regulation Act 1890 (‘IRRA 1890’), s. 1(1), s.13(1) and s. 39; Taxes Management Act 1970 (‘TMA 1970’), s. 
1; Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, ss. 1(1), 6(2); Value Added Tax Act 1994 Sch. 11(1). 
21 CRCA 2005, s. 5. 
22 See: Fleet Street Casuals, supra n. 17, p. 663 (Lord Roskill); p. 637 (Lord Diplock); p. 635 (Lord 
Wilberforce); p. 654 (Lord Scarman); R. (Davies) v. HMRC; R. (Gaines-Cooper) v. HMRC [2011] UKSC 47, 
para 26 (Lord Wilson), [2012] 1 All ER 1048; R. (Wilkinson) v. IRC [2005] UKHL 30, [2006] S.T.C. 270, paras 
20-21 (Lord Hoffmann). Discretion in the hands of Customs & Excise in this regard was identical to that of the 
Inland Revenue: R. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners, ex p. Kay & Co Ltd [1996] S.T.C. 1500; Fine Art 
Developments plc v. Customs & Excise Commissioners [1994] S.T.C. 668; Customs & Excise Commissioners v. 
Croydon Hotel & Leisure Co Ltd [1995] S.T.C. 855. 
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“casual” newspaper workers. The “amnesty” purported to forego investigation into past tax 
liabilities of the group of casual workers in return for the completion of the two prior years’ 
returns and future compliance.23 For the Revenue, the reason underpinning the agreement to 
extinguish such past liabilities, which was estimated to cost the exchequer £1mil for each 
year24, derived from the practical inability to obtain the requisite taxing information of the 
casual workers.25 For instance, the workers used names such as “Mickie Mouse of Sunset 
Boulevard” and “Sir Gordon Richards of Tattenham Corner”26 in order to hide their true 
identities from the Revenue. The trade unions did know the details of the casual workers, but 
there existed the potential of an industrial strike if the unions gave up the details of these 
workers.27  
In the House of Lords hearing of the case, the starting point for the Lords on the issue 
of HMRC’s discretion lay in the “statutory code”,28 namely the primary statutory 
responsibility of the Revenue, upon which a few points merited elaboration. The first is that 
there exist two separate responsibilities: that of collection and that of care and management.29 
Secondly, it is plainly impractical to collect every part of tax due. It is this impracticality, 
which necessarily conflicts with the duty of care and management, that was accepted as 
giving rise to managerial discretion.30 In other words, the effect of the literally read duty to 
collect every part of tax is diluted by the duty to care and manage,31 thereby creating partial 
autonomy, or discretion, for the Revenue.32 Ultimately, their Lordships were satisfied that the 
arrangement arrived at, between the Revenue and the workers, unions and employers, fell 
within the Revenue’s wide managerial discretion.33 Lord Diplock went further however and 
explained that: 
 
“[T]he board have a wide managerial discretion as to the best means of 
obtaining for the national exchequer from the taxes committed to their charge, 
the highest net return that is practicable having regard to the staff available to 
them and the cost of collection”34 
 
This statement has generally been quoted approvingly in all subsequent cases dealing 
with HMRC’s managerial discretion.35 In the 2005 case of R. (Wilkinson) v. IRC 
                                                 
23 Fleet Street Casuals, supra n. 17, pp. 634-635. 
24 Ibid, p. 634. 
25 ibid. 
26 R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex p National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd 
[1980] Q.B. 407, p. 418 (Court of Appeal). 
27 Fleet Street Casuals, supra n. 17, p. 635. 
28 Ibid, p. 650 (Lord Scarman). 
29 For instance, see: Gaines-Cooper, supra n. 22, para 26 (Lord Wilson); R. (Davies) v. HMRC; R. (Gaines-
Cooper) v. HMRC [2010] EWCA Civ. 83, (2010) S.T.C. 860, para 111 (Moses LJ). 
30 Fleet Street Casuals, supra n. 17, p. 650 (Lord Scarman); pp. 631-632 (Lord Wilberforce); p. 636 (Lord 
Diplock); p. 659 (Lord Roskill). 
31 cf New Zealand Stock Exchange v. CIR [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 1, p. 3; Griffiths S. (2012), "No discretion should 
be unconstrained": considering the "care and management" of taxes and the settlement of tax disputes in New 
Zealand and the UK. British Tax Review, 2, p. 167. 
32 Fleet Street Casuals, supra n. 17, p. 651 (Lord Scarman). 
33 Ibid, p. 663 (Lord Roskill); p. 637 (Lord Diplock); p. 635 (Lord Wilberforce); p. 654 (Lord Scarman). Lord 
Fraser declined to comment. 
34 Ibid, p. 636. This point was not expressly endorsed by the other judges in the case. 
35 See for instance, Gaines-Cooper, supra n 22, para 26 (Lord Wilson); Wilkinson, supra n. 22, paras 20-21 
(Lord Hoffmann). 
Stephen Daly (Draft version). Please do not cite this version without author’s permission. 
 5 
(‘Wilkinson’),36 the House of Lords added some substance to Lord Diplock’s explanation of 
managerial discretion. The applicant was a widower, whom, had he been a widow, would 
have been entitled to a widow’s bereavement allowance under section 262 of the Income and 
Corporation Taxes Act 1988. Mr Wilkinson argued, inter alia, that HMRC could utilize their 
managerial discretion to extend the allowance to widowers. The House of Lords rejected the 
applicant’s claim and held that the managerial discretion endowed upon HMRC cannot be so 
widely construed as to concede such an allowance which Parliament could have granted but 
did not grant.37 Lord Hoffmann additionally added that:38 
 
“This discretion enables the commissioners to formulate policy in the 
interstices of the tax legislation, dealing pragmatically with minor or transitory 
anomalies, cases of hardship at the margins or cases in which a statutory rule 
is difficult to formulate or its enactment would take up a disproportionate 
amount of Parliamentary time” 
 
Decisions taken pursuant to HMRC’s managerial discretion will only be disturbed by 
the courts where “exceptional circumstances” arise as noted by Lord Carnwath. For instance, 
where HMRC has acted with “conspicuous unfairness”, by departing without notice from a 
longstanding practice to accept late applications for tax relief,39 or by refusing to give effect 
to legitimate expectations,40 or by failing to take account of the comparative unfairness of 
applying dissimilar treatment to similarly placed taxpayers,41 the courts will intervene. 
In brief, as HMRC’s wide managerial discretion derives from its primary function to 
collect and manage taxes and credits as endowed by Parliament, it is for the Revenue to 
establish the best means of facilitating collection and management of taxes, with the courts 
overruling the exercise of managerial discretion in exceptional circumstances only. Thus, 
whilst there is no special principle of public law which applies to HMRC only, HMRC’s 
actions with respect to collection and management take place in a “special context” thereby 
requiring restraint on behalf of the courts. 
 
THE DANGER OF DISTINCTIVE TREATMENT  
If HMRC can persuade a court that an action falls within its wide managerial discretion, then 
the affected taxpayer will have little prospect of success. The courts will be highly reluctant 
to intervene if persuaded of such. That is problematic however as it may lead courts to 
mistakenly fail to apply even general principles of law correctly to HMRC. Several cases in 
recent years demonstrate this potential, namely R (Ingenious Media) v HMRC (Ingenious 
                                                 
36 Wilkinson, supra n. 22. 
37 Ibid, para 20 (Lord Hoffmann). 
38 Ibid, para 21.  
39 Unilever, supra n. 15. 
40 R. (Cameron) v. HMRC [2012] EWHC 1174, [2012] S.T.C. 1691; R. (Greenwich Property Ltd) v. 
Commissioners of Customs and Excise [2001] EWHC 230, [2001] S.T.C. 618. 
41 R. (Hely-Hutchinson) v. HMRC [2015] EWHC 3261, [2016] S.T.C. 962 (on which, see: Daly, S. (2016), 
Fairness in tax law and revenue guidance: R (Hely-Hutchinson) v HMRC. British Tax Review, 1, 18-27. Note 
that the judgment in the appeal of this case is outstanding at the time of writing. 
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Media),42 UK Uncut Legal Action Ltd v. HM Revenue and Customs (‘UK Uncut’)43 and R 
(Bampton) v HMRC (‘Bampton’).44 In Ingenious Media, the problem lay in conceptualizing 
as a matter of discretion that which was actually a matter of common law confidentiality. In 
the latter two cases, the issue lay in failing to properly apply public law principles after 
accepting that the decisions fell within HMRC’s discretion. 
Ingenious Media 
The author has written about the case in an extended case note for the British Tax Review45 
with the result that there is little purpose in reiterating the views expressed therein in any 
depth in this piece. The case concerned an “off the record” disclosure by David Hartnett, then 
Permanent Secretary for tax at HMRC, to journalists from The Times. The subject of the 
conversation was tax avoidance schemes that were taking advantage of the “Film 
Partnership” legislative provisions. Over the course of the meeting, Hartnett referred 
specifically to the applicants, Ingenious Media and Patrick McKenna, as marketers of such 
avoidance schemes,46 noted that they had contributed to depriving the public purse of circa 
£5billion;47 that McKenna had personally benefited from the tax relief48 and denounced such 
schemes as “scams for scumbags”.49 Some of these comments were later quoted, albeit with 
anonymity attached, in two articles published by the journalists in The Times on 21 June 
2012.50 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Ingenious Media and McKenna (the Claimants) sought 
judicial review of the decision of Hartnett to disclose such information to The Times 
journalists.  
The Claimants, inter alia, submitted that the disclosure of taxpayer information in the 
case breached section 18 of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 (CRCA 
2005). This prohibits HMRC officials from disclosing information which is held by HMRC 
“in connection with a function of” HMRC51, except where the disclosure is “made for the 
purposes of a function of” HMRC.52 HMRC’s argument in response, with which both the 
High Court53 and the Court of Appeal54 agreed, was that the disclosure of taxpayer 
information was necessary for the purpose of tax collection. Both courts accepted that there 
was a rational connection between the function of HMRC to collect tax in an efficient and 
                                                 
42 R. (on the application of Ingenious Media and another) v. HMRC (Ingenious Media (HC)) [2013] EWHC 
3258 (Admin), [2014] S.T.C. 673; R. (on the application of Ingenious Media and another) v. HMRC (Ingenious 
Media (CA)) [2015] EWCA Civ. 173, [2015] S.T.C. 1357; R. (on the application of Ingenious Media and 
another) v. HMRC (Ingenious Media (SC)) [2016] UKSC 54. 
43 UK Uncut Legal Action Ltd v. HM Revenue and Customs [2013] EWHC 1283 (Admin).  
44 R. (Bampton) v. HMRC [2012] EWHC 361 (‘Bampton’); R. (Bampton) v. HMRC [2012] EWCA Civ. 1744 
(‘Bampton (CA)’). 
45 Daly S., (2017), Public disclosures and HMRC’s duty of confidentiality: R (Ingenious Media) v HMRC. 
British Tax Review, 1, 10-21. 
46 Ingenious Media (CA), supra n. 42, para 9. 
47 Ibid, para 10. 
48 Ibid, para 11. 
49 ibid. 
50 Mostrous A., Schlesinger F. and Watson R. (2012), Screen play: how movie millions are moved offshore. The 
Times, 21 June 2012; Schlesinger F. (2012), World of glitz and glamour that’s on the Revenue’s radar. The 
Times,, 21 June, 2012. 
51 CRCA 2005 s. 18(1). 
52 CRCA 2005 s. 18(2)(a)(i). 
53 Ingenious Media (HC), supra n. 42, paras 38-51. 
54 Ingenious Media (CA), supra n. 42, paras 26-30, 37-47. 
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cost-effective way and the disclosures made by Hartnett in the course of the briefing.55 Both 
accepted that the decision as to whether to disclose taxpayer information to the media was in 
the nature of an evaluative judgment, in relation to which the courts should not approach 
whether to condemn such decisions as if they were the primary decision-makers’.56 The 
Supreme Court unanimously overturned this assessment. In the oral hearing of the case, Lord 
Toulson commented that “[t]he courts below proceeded on the basis that it was 
discretionary…There is a question mark whether in the area of duties of confidence you are 
in the territory of discretion properly so understood.”57 The written judgment of the court 
went on to reject the view that HMRC’s duty of confidentiality should be approached as a 
matter of discretion and that the courts should not approach the disclosures as if they were the 
primary decision-makers.58 The court ultimately found that HMRC’s actions had resulted in a 
breach to the body’s duty of confidentiality. The court regarded the idea of sharing 
confidential information with the media as “a matter of serious concern”, justified only in 
extreme circumstances such as “where HMRC officials might be engaged in an anti-
smuggling operation which might be in danger of being wrecked by journalistic 
investigations”.59 
The importance of this case for present purposes lies in the potential for courts to be 
led to error by conceiving of HMRC’s actions as falling within its managerial discretion, to 
which the courts rightly should only intrude in exceptional circumstances, when in fact the 
action could fall to be considered against ordinary legal principles. The assertion of 
“discretion” may lead the judge to continue driving at ordinary speed past an incident 
involving an HMRC officer on the side of the road, when in fact the proper course would be 
to slow down to have a better look. 
UK Uncut and Bampton 
Where an official is vested with decision-making power, she must only direct herself to 
relevant considerations when arriving at a decision. Conversely, the official must not take 
into account irrelevant considerations. This basic principle is known as the doctrine of 
relevancy and where it has been usurped, the decision is said to be ultra vires. The general 
rule however is subject to a minor caveat, namely, where the official would inevitably have 
arrived at the same decision despite having taken into account an irrelevant consideration or 
failed to take into account a relevant consideration. A decision will not be set aside 
accordingly where an irrelevant factor played an ‘insignificant or insubstantial’ role.60 In the 
leading authority R. (FDA) v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (‘FDA’),61 Lord 
Neuberger (then Master of the Rolls) stressed that this would only exceptionally arise. In so 
doing, the learned judge cited approvingly the judgments of Purchas LJ in Simplex G.E. v. 
                                                 
55 Ingenious Media (HC), supra n. 42, para 39; Ingenious Media (CA), supra n. 42, paras 42-46.  
56 Ingenious Media (HC), supra n. 1, paras 40-42; Ingenious Media (CA), supra n. 1, paras 44-46. 
57 See the recording of the Supreme Court hearing on the Supreme Court’s website, available at: 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/watch/uksc-2015-0082/040716-am.html [Accessed 13th April 2017] from 
4.04mins to 4.37mins. 
58 Ingenious Media (SC), supra n. 42, para 29. 
59 ibid, para 35. 
60 R (FDA) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2013] 1 W.L.R. 444, para 67 (Lord Neuberger); Simplex 
G.E. v Secretary of State for the Environment and the City and District of St. Albans District Council (1989) 57 
P & C.R. 306, p. 326 (Purchas LJ). 
61 FDA, supra n. 60. 
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Secretary of State for the Environment (‘Simplex’)62 and May LJ in R. (Smith) v. North 
Eastern Derbyshire Primary Care Trust (‘Smith’),63 which similarly emphasize the high 
threshold to be satisfied to disprove the impact that an irrelevant consideration played. In the 
former, it was held that: 
 
“It is not necessary for [the Claimant] to show that the Minister would, or even 
probably would, have come to a different conclusion. He has to exclude only 
the contrary contention, namely that the Minister necessarily would still have 
made the same decision.”64 
 
 May LJ in Smith read the law as likewise importing such a significant hurdle: 
“Probability is not enough. The defendant would have to show that the decision would 
inevitably have been the same.”65 That it would be inconvenient for the decision-maker to 
retake a decision where it is probable, but not inevitable, that she would arrive at the same 
conclusion cannot be helped. As held by Atkin LJ in General Medical Council v Spackman, 
‘[c]onvenience and justice are often not on speaking terms’.66 
 As such, it is incumbent on the court to interrogate the impact that an irrelevant 
consideration plays in the decision-making process where it is demonstrated one has been 
taken into account. In the case of FDA, which concerned a challenge to the Government's 
alteration to the basis upon which public service pensions are annually adjusted to take 
account of inflation, Lord Neuberger considered the matter obiter. Such adjustments are 
normally made each April by statutory instrument, and, for many years, they had been up-
rated in accordance with the increase in the Retail Price Index ('RPI') over the year ending the 
previous September. However, the Government decided that from and including April 2011, 
such adjustments should be made in accordance with the increase in the Consumer Price 
Index ('CPI'). It was this decision that formed the basis of the judicial review. One of the 
questions was whether the effect on the national economy was a relevant factor for 
considering a change from RPI to CPI. The court held that it was. If the court had found in 
the alternative, Lord Neuberger elaborated that the decision would have remained the same in 
spite of this irrelevant consideration. The evidence supporting this conclusion, in the case, 
was overwhelming. Indeed, there was no evidence cited in the judgment to the contrary. 
Various experts’ statements were cited as evidence in the court that CPI was a more 
appropriate matrix, namely, a senior policy adviser to the Department of Work and Pensions, 
the Director of Public Spending at the Treasury, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State 
at the Department of Work and Pensions, and the Minister of State for Pensions. 
 The level of scrutiny afforded by Purchas LJ in Simplex to the impact that an 
irrelevant consideration had on the decision in question more forcefully illustrates the role 
that the court plays in ensuring that the decision-maker has exercised her powers 
appropriately. The appellants in this case claimed that the Secretary of State for the 
Environment had taken into account an irrelevant consideration when rejecting their planning 
appeals. The irrelevant consideration in question related to a study carried out on the use of 
green belt spaces in St Albans and recommendations related to that study. The Secretary of 
State misconceived this study, thinking that it recommended that the space in question be 
                                                 
62 Simplex, supra n. 60. 
63 R. (Smith) v. North Eastern Derbyshire Primary Care Trust [2006] 1 W.L.R. 3315. 
64 Simplex, supra n. 60, p. 328. 
65 Smith, supra n. 63, para 10. 
66 General Medical Council v. Spackman [1943] A.C. 627, p. 638 as cited in R. v. Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Ex parte Brent London Borough Council [1982] Q.B. 593, p. 646 (Ackner LJ). 
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maintained as green belt. In fact, the study did not make a judgment on the appropriateness of 
allocating the land as green belt or not, but rather made recommendations simply on the use 
of green belt space. It was common ground in the case that the Secretary of State had erred in 
his understanding of the study. The question for the court was whether the Secretary of State 
would still have rejected the planning appeals had he not taken into account this irrelevant 
consideration. In seeking to answer this question, the Court of Appeal forensically 
interrogated the Secretary of State’s “admirably succinct, skilfully and carefully drafted” 
decision letter.67 On the whole, Purchas LJ, who gave the lead judgment in the unanimous 
decision, found it “impossible to consider” that the reference to the (misconceived 
interpretation of the) study in the decision letter had no impact on the decision.68 In support 
of this assessment, Purchas LJ proceeded to go through the decision letter line by line in 
order to analyse the impact that the irrelevant consideration made on the decision: 
 
“[The Secretary of State] emphasised in the second sentence [of the letter] that 
he had had regard to the recommendations of the first inspector and mentioned 
the subject of a special study. The juxtaposition of that “special study” and the 
study referred to in the third sentence which the Minister records the council 
as having themselves “studied” is irrefutable and a logical step in the 
Minister's reasoning. Having referred to these matters and to further features 
of the planning context, the Minister starts the sentence in which he records 
his disagreement with the second inspector with the word “accordingly,” 
thereby embracing the preceding considerations including the error relating to 
the Napsbury Policy 75C study.”69 
 
This reads like the analysis of a poem. There is meticulous attention to detail and that 
which can be extrapolated from the detail. The Secretary of State’s letter begins by 
referencing a “special study”; given the sentence construction, this “special study” must be 
the study in question; this “special study” was then studied (therefore taken into 
consideration); and its conclusions embraced as implied by the use of the proceeding word 
“accordingly”. The conclusion drawn from this mechanical scrutiny could only be that the 
irrelevant consideration was “undeniably” a significant factor in the decision-making 
process.70 
 
UK Uncut 
 
The zealous investigation of the claim that an irrelevant consideration did not impact the 
decisions at issue in FDA and Simplex can be contrasted with that afforded to an HMRC 
decision in UK Uncut. This case concerned a tax settlement between Goldman Sachs and 
HMRC, which resolved a number of outstanding disputes between the parties. By way of 
background, Goldman Sachs, in addition to several other banks, had entered into tax 
schemes, which purported to have the effect of avoiding National Insurance Contributions 
(‘NICs’). In 2005 however, all but Goldman Sachs had settled with HMRC on terms that they 
would pay 100% of the claimed NICs, but no interest. In 2010, Goldman Sachs agreed with 
HMRC to pay the disputed NIC amount, but not any of the interest that would be owed. The 
Goldman Sachs deal accordingly was settled on the basis of the 2005 terms, but without 
                                                 
67 Simplex, supra n. 60, p. 326. 
68 ibid. 
69 Ibid, pp. 326-327 (Purchas LJ); p. 329 (Staughton LJ); p. 329 (Sir Roualeyn Cumming-Bruce). 
70 Ibid, p. 327 (Purchas LJ), 
Stephen Daly (Draft version). Please do not cite this version without author’s permission. 
 10 
having to pay interest for the enjoyment of the monies in the intervening 5 years. It was 
leaked to the press that this particular interest amounted to £20million,71 although the true 
figure was probably closer to £10mil.72 The decision of whether the settle disputes is a matter 
which falls within HMRC’s managerial discretion. As noted by Nicol J, issues in relation to 
settlements are “quintessentially questions to be decided by the Commissioners themselves 
within the broad managerial discretion given to them by statute”.73 
An action group UK Uncut took a judicial review action claiming that the settlement 
went beyond the powers of HMRC. Of interest for present purposes is the claim that, when 
arriving at the settlement, HMRC took into account an irrelevant consideration, namely, 
“embarrassment to the Chancellor”. David Hartnett, who led the settlement with Goldman 
Sachs and was its chief negotiator, conceded that this consideration was taken into account74 
and that it was irrelevant.75 It was countered however that the decision would inevitably have 
been the same even without this irrelevant consideration.76 Nicol J accepted HMRC’s 
contention on the basis of 3 arguments.77 First, David Hartnett asserted that there were other 
independent and substantial reasons for the decision. Second, that the same decision would 
have been reached is evidenced by the fact that Melanie Dawes, Director General for 
Business Tax within HMRC at the time, reached the same decision without regard to it. 
Third, an independent judge, Sir Andrew Park, produced a report for the National Audit 
Office in which he found the settlement to be reasonable. The court accepted that these 
arguments cumulatively had the effect of proving the irrelevant consideration had an 
insubstantial impact with an analytical brevity which contrasts the studious and 
comprehensive analysis undertaken in FDA and Simplex. 
These reasons however are each fallible on closer inspection. As for the first, this 
naked claim by David Hartnett, as with the Secretary of State’s assertion in Simplex, is 
unquestionably insufficient to shift the burden which requires that it be proved that the 
decision would have been inevitably reached. As for the second, the assessment of Dawes is 
likewise insufficient to shift the burden for two reasons. The first is that she came to the case 
at the end of November 2010 after the initial meeting with Goldman Sachs and promise of 
settlement (without interest) had taken place. As the court rightly conceded earlier in the 
judgment, it needs to be cautious of later reasons and be aware of the risk that they have been 
composed subsequently to justify the decision and are a retrospective justification of that 
original decision.78 In this regard, the potential for unconscious retroactive justification by 
Dawes is particularly high given that between the end of November 2010 and the middle of 
December 2010, when the decision was approved, she had numerous, albeit brief, 
conversations with David Hartnett.79 Whilst this does not render the evidence of Dawes 
without merit, it does warrant caution and greater scrutiny of this reason. The second more 
powerful reason is that focusing on Dawes’ evidence is selective. Contemporaries within 
HMRC at the time, namely Solicitor and General Counsel to HMRC Anthony Inglese and 
                                                 
71 Public Accounts Committee, (2011) HM revenue & customs 2010-11 Accounts: Tax disputes. HC 1531 
(2010-12), p. 3.  
72 This was the figure which was discussed at the Public Accounts Committee hearing. ibid ‘Minutes of 
Evidence’ Q24 and Q26. 
73 UK Uncut, supra n. 41, para 63. 
74 ibid, para 22. 
75 Ibid, para 34. 
76 ibid. 
77 Ibid, para 57. 
78 Ibid, para 56. 
79 Ibid, para 16. 
Stephen Daly (Draft version). Please do not cite this version without author’s permission. 
 11 
other lawyers, seemed to suggest that a different deal including the interest element ought to 
have been secured: 
 
“On 8th December 2010 there was a meeting in the offices of Anthony Inglese, 
(Solicitor and General Counsel to HMRC). The others present were, it seems, 
other HMRC lawyers... There was concern among this group about a 
settlement with Goldman Sachs which omitted interest, in particular whether 
this was consistent with the Litigation and Settlement Strategy and whether it 
was right to impose no cost on Goldman Sachs for having resisted paying 
NICs so much longer than other companies who had adopted the same 
arrangement. Mr Inglese is recorded as saying, 
 
[H]e would always want to assist [David Hartnett], but not if this were 
'unconscionable'. He referred to the difficulty all those present at this 
meeting were having in justifying a settlement without an interest 
element80” 
 
 As such, the evidence of other similarly placed persons in HMRC counterbalances the 
evidence of Melanie Dawes. To this end, it cannot be concluded that a decision is inevitable 
if other senior HMRC officials have assessed that a different deal could have been done. As 
for the third reason that Park concluded that the deal was reasonable, there are several 
important problems which undermine the veracity of this justification. The first is a 
misconception, namely that Park was analysing the settlement from the perspective of a 
public authority properly carrying out its functions as prescribed by Parliament. There is a 
subtle but crucial distinction between the latter and the terms of reference for Park’s study of 
the deal. Reasonableness is not a legal standard in Park’s report, but rather is defined as 
follows: 
“In evaluating reasonableness, we have considered whether the settlements 
represent fair value for the Exchequer and were in the public interest. This 
included considering whether the settlement was as good as or better than the 
outcome that might be expected from litigation, considering the risks, 
uncertainties, costs and timescale of litigation”81 
 
 This definition of reasonableness does not include other important factors that an 
HMRC official must take into account such as, importantly, rationality, compliance with 
internal processes, and whether the settlement complies with HMRC’s written guidance on 
settling disputes, the notorious Litigation and Settlement Strategy (‘LSS’).82 Accordingly, 
reasonableness is used in a looser sense than as is used in a legal context and it is incorrect to 
say that a decision which satisfies the former will likewise satisfy the latter. Moreover, 
reliance upon the Park report is problematic in the circumstances as it selectively chooses 
extracts from the report which favour HMRC’s case, but neglect the important qualifications 
which do not. For instance, the Park report also found that there were “significant errors in 
the process of reaching the settlement”83 - was this agreement then in line with public law 
requirements? Similarly, Park and HMRC disagree on the flexibility of HMRC’s LSS with 
                                                 
80 Ibid, para 17. 
81 National Audit Office (2012), Settling large tax disputes. p. 5. 
82 HMRC (2011), Litigation and Settlement Strategy, available at: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/practitioners/lss.pdf 
[Accessed 13 April 2017].  
83 NAO, Settling Large Tax Disputes, supra n. 81, p. 46. 
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which it should comply. Whilst Park’s opinion was that the LSS “does not recognise the 
reality that when the Department and a taxpayer enter a process to resolve multiple complex, 
finely-balanced issues at once, interdependency is created between these issues”,84 HMRC’s 
understanding, as recited by the court in UK Uncut, was that there could be no “horse-
trading” or “package deals”.85 This is important as HMRC generally is required to comply 
with its published guidance,86 which in this case it appears it did not. Park’s conclusion that 
the deal was “reasonable” therefore does not take into account whether the deal was in line 
with public law requirements. In sum, HMRC and Park arrived at the same conclusion but for 
entirely different and opposing reasons. It feels closer to coincidence than inevitability that 
the results were congruous. 
 The three reasons that underpin the court’s finding that the decision reached was 
inevitable accordingly are questionable when analysed more closely. Given the general 
principle that a significant threshold must be surpassed before it will be deduced that an 
irrelevant consideration played an immaterial role, the court’s analysis is entirely 
unsatisfactory, particularly when contrasted with the approaches in FDA and Simplex. After 
recognizing that the settlement was a matter which fell within HMRC’s managerial 
discretion, the court went on to fail to properly apply legal principles. This error was different 
from what arose in Ingenious Media wherein the erroneous characterization of the decision as 
a matter of discretion caused the error. In this case there was the characterization of the 
matter as discretionary, followed thereafter by a judicial error. It highlights that even where a 
decision is discretionary, the courts should be wary not to misapply the relevant legal 
principles. 
 
Bampton 
 
A similar issue arises in the case of Bampton. The taxpayers sought judicial review of an 
HMRC decision to refuse late claims to group loss relief. HMRC have discretion to accept 
late claims, but in this case refused. A question arose as to whether HMRC were entitled to 
take the prospect of “tax avoidance” into account when exercising its discretion.87 However, 
even if it was not a relevant consideration, both the High Court and Court of Appeal accepted 
that the same decision would have been arrived at in any event. The Court of Appeal only 
briefly dealt with the issue, as this ground was not argued explicitly on appeal,88 so it is more 
prudent to investigate the High Court’s reasoning.  
 Alan King of HMRC arrived at the relevant decision for the purposes of the review 
after having made a “technical submission” on the issue to Paul Jefferies and having received 
advice in response. Mr Jefferies was a policy and technical specialist with HMRC at the time. 
Blair J in the High Court accepted that in this “technical submission”, the issue of tax 
avoidance loomed large, but that the response from Jefferies did not mention tax avoidance.89 
                                                 
84 Ibid, p. 8.  
85 UK Uncut, supra n. 41, para 10. It is worth clarifying that although the LSS was updated in 2011, the remarks 
here both refer to the understanding of the LSS prior to 2011. It is also worth noting that Park found that the deal 
complied with the LSS. However, the reasoning underpinning this finding is conspicuously not provided in the 
report. 
86 See for instance, R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte MFK Underwriting [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1545, p. 
1569 (Bingham LJ). 
87 Ultimately both Courts found that tax avoidance was indeed a relevant consideration, see: Bampton, supra n. 
44, paras 128-129; Bampton (CA), supra n. 44, paras 106-109. 
88 That the same decision would have been arrived at anyway was accepted without question in the Court of 
Appeal, see: Bampton (CA), supra n. 44, paras 41, 63-64. 
89 Bampton, supra n. 44, para 127. 
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As this was the contemporaneous document upon which the decision was made, the learned 
judge concluded that tax avoidance was not a “driving issue” in the decision.90  
This conclusion is problematic for two reasons. First, as stressed above, the test is not 
whether a consideration was the driving force behind a decision, but whether the role it 
played was “insignificant” or not. At any rate, even though it was not “driving” in the court’s 
eyes, it nevertheless accepted that the matter loomed large in the mind of the decision-maker. 
This suggests that the matter was given some weight: a balancing between considerations in 
the mind of the decision-maker. That is not a standard of insignificance, as is required, but 
rather strays more towards one of probability, which was expressly rejected in Smith.91 As 
such, the Court failed to apply the relevant test and standard. Secondly and more importantly, 
the contemporaneous document on closer inspection does not support the court’s assertion. It 
merely summarises HMRC’s policy on late claims, sets out the facts of the current case, and 
concludes that: “Considering all the circumstances as presented, it would not appear to be 
unreasonable for HMRC to refuse the late group relief claim[s]”.92 This response is written in 
the negative. Moreover, recall that this was written in response to a submission in which the 
issue of tax avoidance had loomed large. When combined with the relative emptiness (by that 
I mean that it is a mere summary of facts and HMRC policy) of this contemporaneous 
document, it is suggested that Mr Jefferies response in fact merely confirms that Mr King’s 
decision may take account of tax avoidance. In brief, the contemporaneous document does 
not support the case that the same decision would have been arrived at inevitably.  
 In the case of UK Uncut and Bampton then, the level of interrogation given to the 
importance placed upon irrelevant considerations failed to accord with the standard laid down 
in cases such as FDA and Simplex. Both UK Uncut and Bampton highlight the prospect of 
errors arising when dealing with discretionary decisions of HMRC. 
CONCLUSION 
Hickman writes that “[c]ourts and commentators have read the Court’s Mayo Foundation 
decision broadly as repudiating tax exceptionalism from general administrative law 
requirements, doctrines, and norms”. At the same time however, “[l]egal scholars have 
identified numerous ways in which tax administrative practices arguably have deviated from 
general administrative law requirements, doctrines, and norms”. 
This article has looked at this dichotomy from the perspective of the UK highlighting 
on the one hand the fact that there are no (longer) “special principles” of law which apply in 
the case of HMRC, whilst on the other hand acknowledging that decisions taken by HMRC 
pursuant to its discretion take place in a “special context”. These decisions should, the Privy 
Council most recently told us in The United Policyholders, only be overturned in 
“exceptional circumstances”. 
This idea of deference to discretionary decisions however has the potential to lead the 
courts astray. When dealing with this “special context”, courts should be careful about the 
application of general legal principles. Characterising as discretionary decisions which should 
not in fact be afforded such deference can lead the courts to fail to interrogate sufficiently the 
propriety of HMRC actions. In Ingenious Media, the problem of mischaracterisation caused 
the courts to approach the decision from the wrong perspective. Even where decisions are 
properly characterised as discretionary, the courts should be wary not to incorrectly apply 
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legal principles. In the cases of UK Uncut and Bampton, the errors by the courts correlated 
with the fact that the HMRC decisions under review were discretionary. Whilst incorrect 
mischaracterisation will lead the judges to fail to slow down to take a good look at the action 
of the HMRC official on the side of the road, even correct characterisation may lead the 
judge to drive at the correct speed, but to pay insufficient attention to the HMRC official’s 
actions. 
 
